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"Can You Hear Me Now?": Making 
Participatory Governance Work for the Poor 
Jaime Alison Lee* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Participatory governance engages people who are affected by a problem 
in the process of solving it. A participatory-governance approach to inner-
city crime, for example, might include local residents in the process of de-
signing a community-policing program. l A community health center might 
place patients on its board of directors since they have unique knowledge 
about how the center can better serve those under its care.2 
In recent decades, courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, and 
other institutions all have used participatory-governance approaches to 
tackle complex problems of law and public policy. Legal scholars have ob-
served participatory-governance principles at work in fields as diverse as 
financial regulation,3 public-education reform,4 and poverty law," and have 
identified certain principles as common to these initiatives, which are some-
times referred to collectively as the "New Governance" movement.6 
* Assistant Professor of Law and Director of the Community Development Clinic at the 
University of Baltimore School of Law. I am grateful for the support of Audrey McFarlane, 
Susan Bennett, Michele Gilman, Lydia Nussbaum, my research assistants, Lauren Bell and 
Gregory Fox, and the University of Baltimore. 
I See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimen-
talism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 328-32 (1998); Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and 
the "New Paradigm" (<t' Police Accountability: A Democratic Approach to Police Rejbrm, 59 
CnH. U. L. REv. 373 (2010). 
2 See generally Yolonda Y. Campbell, New Governance in Action: Community Health 
Centers and the Public Health Service Act, 4 ST. Lours U. 1. HEALTH L. & POL'y 397 (2011). 
, See Cristie Ford, New Governance in the Teeth (~f'Human Frailty: Lessons From Finan-
cial Regulation, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 441. 
4 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 1, at 328-32. 
5 See David A. Super, Laboratories of'Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the 
Failure of'Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. Rnv. 541 (2008). 
6 In the seminal work that gave rise to the umbrella term "New Governance," Orly Lobel 
identified eight unifying characteristics among strains of thought previously presented under 
twenty-three separate labels: 
reflexive law, soft law, collaborative governance, democratic experimentalism, re-
sponsive regulation, outsourcing regulation, reconstitutive law, post-regulatory law, 
revitalizing regulation, regulatory pluralism, decentering regulation, meta-regulation, 
contractarian law, communicative governance, negotiated governance, destabiliza-
tion rights, cooperative implementation, interactive compliance, public laboratories, 
deepened democracy and empowered participatory governance, pragmatic lawyer-
ing, nonrival partnership, and a daring legal system. 
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of'Regulation and the Rise of' Governance in Contem-
porary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342, 384 (2004) (footnotes omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). This article, like many others, employs the umbrella term "New 
Governance" for convenience, while acknowledging that this term may be overbroad, see gen-
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Among the core principles of the New Governance model are a com-
mitment to decentralized problem solving by local stakeholders, and the 
ongoing adjustment of rules and policies informed by on-the-ground moni-
toring and feedback, also referred to as "learning by doing."7 In both of 
these components of the New Governance process, stakeholder participation 
plays a critical part. 
The New Governance model is often contrasted with the "command-
and-control" governance model, which emphasizes centralized, top-down 
decision making and static rules. The New Governance model poses bene-
fits as well as risks. Some scholars herald its potential to improve legal and 
policy outcomes, increase institutional accountability, empower marginal-
ized groups, and further democratic ideals of self-determination and equal-
ity. Yet others worry that it can also be used to promote grave ills, such as 
the capture of public power by private interests, the evasion of accountabil-
ity, and the deepening subordination of already marginalized communities. 
What distinguishes these two alternate visions of New Governance? In 
part, the distinction may lie in whether marginalized stakeholders-those 
who traditionally have had little int1uence on matters of governance and who 
are subject to subordination under the systems under reform-can meaning-
fully participate in the process. Marginalized stakeholders can offer valua-
ble new information and perspectives, and can increase accountability by 
serving as a check on established interests. On the other hand, when 
marginalized stakeholders do not actually int1uence the outcome, the par-
ticipatory process becomes merely "cosmetic" and affirmatively subverts 
the good-governance aims that it is meant to achieve. 
Scholars have observed the phenomenon of the cosmetic process in a 
wide range of settings, and have decried its corrupting effects on New Gov-
ernance systems and on other kinds of participatory processes. The problem 
is especially acute when poor people are involved, since they face particu-
larly steep barriers to meaningful participation. Proposals to thwart cosmetic 
processes are scattered throughout the literature, but there exists no concep-
erally Bradley C. Karkkainen, "New Governance" in Legal Thought and in the World: Some 
Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. Rnv. 471 (2004) (criticizing the 
use of the general term "New Governance" in place of naming the specific nomenclature), and 
that many of the works cited herein relate to specific strains of thought within the New Gov-
ernance umbrella, such as democratic experimentalism, see, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William 
H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GE). L.J. 53 
(2011) (defining "democratic experimentalism" and arguing for its application in certain con-
texts). This article, like others, also uses the broader term "participatory governance" where 
appropriate. It also cites to many works that are not explicitly identified with the New Gov-
ernance movement or that pre-date the terminology, since many of the concerns and issues 
implicated are not solely concerns associated with the New Governance movement, such as the 
problems of meaningful participation by marginalized stakeholders and institutional 
accountability. 
7 These elements are most essential to the purposes of this article. Scholars have devel-
oped various formulations. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 6, at 405 (describing eight organizing 
principles among different strains of thought); Sabel & Simon, supra note 6, at 79 (describing 
four principles of democratic experimentalism). 
2013] Participatory Governance 407 
tua1 framework for how to better promote meaningful participation by 
marginalized stakeholders. Nor is there a coherent theory for why one sys-
tem might result in meaningful participation when another may be highly 
susceptible to producing a cosmetic result. 
This article proposes to fill both of these gaps. It does so by drawing a 
seemingly unlikely parallel between participatory-governance systems and 
business transactions. It posits that two conditions exist in prospective busi-
ness transactions: first, all participants must be motivated toward a common 
goal, and second, they must recognize what the other participants contribute 
to that goal. These two conditions are necessary before prospective partners 
will strive toward agreement on the business terms. 
The article posits that these same two conditions must exist among par-
ticipants in a New Governance process in order for meaningful participation 
to occur. These two conditions are not sufficient to guarantee that meaning-
ful participation will occur, but they are necessary for it to be possible. 
Thus, the two conditions are the baseline or threshold conditions that must 
exist before a New Governance process that purports to include poor people 
can be conducted with integrity. 
Articulating the baseline conditions leads to a clearer conceptual under-
standing of why cosmetic participation occurs, and also offers a structural 
framework for identifying how to combat it. This framework explains how 
court-based New Governance processes attempt to combat cosmetic partici-
pation-as well as how meaningful participation can be promoted in New 
Governance systems taking place outside the courtroom, which are espe-
cially susceptible to producing cosmetic results. 
The framework also supports a baseline theory of prevention against 
cosmetic processes that aids in distinguishing when the New Governance 
approach may be suitable as a problem-solving method and where it should 
be rejected because it carries too high a risk of producing a cosmetic result. 
Part II of this article illustrates the New Governance approach and em-
phasizes the role that marginalized groups play in improving outcomes and 
enhancing accountability. It also explains the problem of cosmetic participa-
tion and why systems that involve poor people are especially susceptible to 
it. 
Part III explains how New Governance theory envisions meaningful 
participation by marginalized stakeholders taking place, and articulates the 
baseline-conditions framework as a necessary supplement to that vision. It 
further explains how courts that apply New Governance methods promote 
the baseline conditions. 
Part IV turns to New Governance systems that take place outside of the 
courtroom. It analyzes, through the lens of the baseline-conditions frame-
work, a variety of proposals intended to promote meaningful participation. 
It argues that the active promotion of meaningful participation is necessary 
and that where it cannot be actively promoted, the New Governance ap-
proach should likely be rejected in favor of another problem-solving method. 
408 Harvard Law & Policy Review 
II. THE NEW GOVERNANCE ApPROACH AND THE PROBLEM 
OF COSMETIC PARTICIPATION 
[Vol. 7 
A few brief examples illustrate some key New Governance principles 
and the broad range of contexts in which the New Governance approach has 
been applied. A discussion of some of its potential advantages follows, as 
does an exploration of the problem of cosmetic participation. 
A. The New Governance Approach: Overview 
A case study first mentioned by Professor Kami Chavis Simmons illus-
trates certain key elements of the New Governance model. ~ In 2001, Cincin-
nati suffered three days of violent protests after city police killed the 
fifteenth African American citizen within a six-year time span.9 Lawsuits 
followed, and a federal judge encouraged the litigants in one of the cases-
the city, the American Civil Liberties Union, and a local organization repre-
senting African American interests-not to pursue the litigation, but instead 
to settle the case by negotiating their own vision of police reform. lo 
The parties agreed with the court's suggestion and invited the police 
union to join the discussions. I I They collaboratively developed an extensive 
participatory-governance process that was documented in a settlement agree-
ment and implemented over a multiyear timespan. The process sought input 
from a criminologist as well as from eight affinity groups representing stake-
holders from across the city: African Americans, other minority groups, 
whites, leaders in business, foundations and educational institutions, youth, 
social-service organizations, and members of the police force and their fami-
lies. 12 Over 3500 stakeholders participated through affinity-group meetings, 
surveys and questionnaires, small roundtable discussions, and an advisory 
councilY 
The process also established an ongoing "evaluation protocol" to moni-
tor whether the goals of the settlement were being met. 14 The monitoring 
process required the extensive use of stakeholder surveys to provide data and 
8 Simmons, supra note I. 
<) See id. at 412, 423-24. 
\0 Id. at 424. 
11Id. 
12Id. at 424-25. 
\3 Collaborative Agreement para. 4, In re Cincinnati Policing, No. C-I-99-317 (S.D. Ohio 
May 3,200 I), available at http://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/linkservid!27 A205FI-69E9-44 
46-BCI8BDI46CB73DF2/showMetalOI. 
14 The "evaluation protocol" requires 
a broad review of whether the goals of the Collaborative are being achieved. The 
Evaluation Protocol calls for an extensive research effort, including four types of 
surveys, an analysis of traffic stops to determine whether there are any patterns of 
racial bias, reviews of videotaped interactions between police and motorists during 
traffic stops, periodic observations of CPOP (community problem-oriented policing) 
meetings, and a review of police statistical data and staffing. 
2013] Participatory Governance 409 
feedback, with special measures taken to include those with no fixed ad-
dresses l5 and those stopped and questioned by police or arrested. 16 
This brief narrative introduces some of the key elements of the New 
Governance model: the participation of a broad array of stakeholders in a 
decentralized problem-solving process,17 and the notion of "learning by 
doing."I~ 
The Cincinnati process reflects New Governance's emphasis on broadly 
inclusionary, decentralized problem solving in that the litigants directly en-
gaged with each other, rather than depending on the court to come up with a 
solution, and also engaged a wide range of stakeholders from across the city. 
Inclusive, decentralized processes reflect the idea that all stakeholders 
affected by a problem should be engaged in the process of solving it. 19 This 
is in part to promote democratic ideals21l and in part because local stakehold-
ers possess valuable knowledge about the nature of the problem, its causes, 
and its solutions,21 which traditional "command-and-control" decision mak-
ers, such as judges or bureaucrats, lack. 
The involvement of marginalized stakeholders is especially critical to 
accountability.22 Marginalized stakeholders are uniquely positioned to offer 
K. JACK RILEY ET AL, POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN CINCINNATI 351 (2005), available at 
http://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/linkservidl98744952-464A-462B-8FCC84AE005BFC 
COl show Meta/Ol. 
15 Collaborative Agreement, supra note 13, para. 35(a). 
16Id. para. 35(b). 
17 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 6, at 79 (noting that decentralization can occur at many 
levels: from the federal government to state governments, from local governments to regulated 
private entities or private contractors hired by the government, from the national office of a 
private organization to a local chapter, from a state administrative office to regional districts, 
or from a school district to individual schools). 
I" Ford, supra note 3, at 446. 
10 See, e.g., Tara 1. Melish, Maximum Feasible Participation of the Poor: New Govern-
ance, New Accountability, and a 21st Century War on the Sources of Poverty, 13 YALE HUM. 
R1S. & DEV. LJ. 1, 58 (2010) (encouraging that "the needs, experiences, and priorities of 
those most affected by social welfare policy [be] taken directly into account as a mandatory 
part of policy formulation and assessment"). 
20 Charles Sabel and Michael Dorf define the aim of democratic experimentalism as 
to change the reasons and evidence produced in public debate, and with them the 
conditions for participation in civic life, so that our disputatious democracy is made 
both more effective as an instrument of public problem solving and more faithful to 
its purpose of assuring the self-determination of free and equal citizens. 
Dorf & Sabel, supra note 1, at 288-89; see also, e.g., Lobel, supra note 6, at 384 ("The 
aspiration of the governance model is that increased engagement will contribute to the building 
of deliberative and collaborative capacities, thus sustaining an environment for democratic 
engagement."). 
21 See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 6, at 90 (noting that the "active participation of 
beneficiaries" in social-welfare programs may be necessary "because effective intervention 
depends on their cooperation or because they have information essential to the diagnosis and 
planning"); Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 86,90 (1986) (describing 
how certain rules allow for "a measure of discretion that permits incorporation of subsystem 
interests and values in decisions"). 
22 See Wendy A. Bach, Governance, Accountability, and the New Poverty Agenda, 2010 
WIS. L. REv. 239, 292 [hereinafter Bach, Governance]; Wendy A. Bach, Welfare Rej()rm, 
Privatization, and Power: Reconfiguring Administrative Law Structures From the Ground Up, 
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new information, perspectives, and ideas, as well as to serve as a check on 
more established actors who might otherwise use New Governance 
processes to further regulatory capture.23 
Also illustrated by the Cincinnati process is the New Governance prin-
ciple of "learning by doing." The evaluation protocol included continual 
scrutiny and adjustment of on-the-ground practices in order to fix mistakes, 
accommodate new information, and adapt to changing circumstances.24 
Learning-by-doing couples experimentation with monitoring, and is meant 
to create a continuously "self-improving" system, in contrast to command-
and-control rules that remain largely static.25 
Learning-by-doing is to be applied not only on a local level; rather, the 
New Governance model envisions the scaling up and standardization of suc-
cessfullocal programs and best practices, so that other jurisdictions can ben-
efit from local experimentation.26 
Learning-by-doing is meant to improve outcomes and increase account-
ability through continuous monitoring and feedback.27 The participation of 
marginalized stakeholders throughout these monitoring-and-feedback cycles 
is crucial to New Governance's ability to impose accountability on more 
established actors, just as such participation is crucial to the initial problem-
solving stage. 
Inclusiveness, decentralized problem solving, and learning-by-doing 
are some of the characteristics that distinguish the model's "deliberateness" 
from mere "informal political, democratic, or majoritarian decision mak-
74 BROOK. L. Rnv. 275, 317-18 (2009) [hereinafter Bach, Wellare RetcJrm]; Lisa Blomgren 
Bingham, Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices and the Incomplete Legal Frame-
workfbr Public and Stakeholder Voice, 2009 J. DISP. REsoL. 269, 307-08 (arguing that "pub-
lic voice, not only in the form of interest groups and stakeholders, but also through direct civic 
engagement of citizens and residents, can address emerging concerns about accountability and 
legitimacy in the New Governance through enhanced transparency"). 
23 Concerns about accountability and regulatory capture are just as high, if not higher, in 
New Governance as in other forms of governance. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 3, at 477; Jody 
Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REv. I, 83 
(1997) ("Some critics worry that collaborative processes might be vehicles through which 
agencies, industry, and powerful public interest groups can collude to undermine the public 
interest. Rather than provide an alternative to interest representation, these processes might 
exacerbate all of its weaknesses."); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Fail-
ure olNegotiated Governance, 81 WASH. u. L.Q. 487, 542 (2003) (stating that where law is 
incomplete, there is a "political opportunity for those with a stake in regulation to push their 
agenda through renegotiation during the implementation and enforcement phases of govern-
ance by constructing a gap-filling interpretation that serves the group's self-interest"); Super, 
supra note 5, at 541; Robert F. Weber, New Governance, Financial Regulation, and Chal-
lenges to Legitimacy: The Example ol the Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy 
Regulation, 62 ADMIN. L. REv. 783, 850-55 (2010). 
24 See generally, e.g., Ford, supra note 3, at 484 (describing "continuous self-assessment" 
in the field of securities regulation as including "iterative, multi-round stress tests; continu-
ously shifting countercyclical capital reserve requirements; and continuous validation of risk-
assessment models"); Lobel, supra note 6, at 355. But see Super, supra note 5, at 556 (dis-
cussing the difficulty in defining reliable metrics). 
25 Cf: Ford, supra note 3, at 483-85. 
20 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 6, at 80-81. 
27 Bach, Governance, supra note 22, at 241. 
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ing."2~ Real-world practices, however, implement the theoretical model 
with varying degrees of thoroughness, in part because New Governance 
scholarship has largely followed the movement as it has unfolded in the 
world, extrapolating its theoretical principles in a post-hoc manner.29 
Regardless, New Governance principles have "visibly influenced a 
broad range of critical policy initiatives in the United States and abroad."30 
The New Governance approach is used by the courts, embedded in legisla-
tion, employed by administrative agencies, and promoted by both for-profit 
and nonprofit firms. Courts, for example, frequently ask litigants to negoti-
ate their own remedies in a wide variety of cases, ranging from employment 
discrimination to securities regulation. The Occupational Safety & Health 
Administration (OSHA) emphasizes decentralized problem solving by stake-
holders in urging unions and employers to design better workplace safety 
procedures, rather than issuing top-down rules designed by bureaucrats.31 
Some federal agencies use the Negotiated Rulemaking Act to draft proposed 
regulations through direct engagement with industry actors and consumer 
groups, rather than following traditional, top-down notice-and-comment 
procedures.32 
Non-governmental organizations can also play leading roles in using 
New Governance techniques to instigate or accelerate reform efforts. Kathe-
rine Kruse, for example, discusses how the Wisconsin Innocence Project 
spearheaded wrongful-conviction reform by taking on a leadership role in 
legislatively supported New Governance procedures.33 The Brennan Center 
for Justice at the New York University School of Law encourages the use of 
a New Governance approach to generate construction jobs for local residents 
from real-estate-development projects.34 Countless other examples of New 
Governance-style approaches exist.35 
2" Douglas Nejaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 336 (2009). 
29 Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools olPublic Action: An Introduc-
tion, 28 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 1611, 1621 (2000) (arguing that New Governance helps us to 
comprehend and manage what has already happened to government). 
30 Sabel & Simon, supra note 6, at 53. 
II See Lobel, supra note 6, at 418-19. 
32 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Perlormance olNe-
gotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE LJ. 1255 (1997). 
33 Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence RetcJrm: Wisconsin's New Governance Exper-
iment, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 645 (2006). 
34 See KATE RUDIN & DOUG SLATER, BRENNAN CTR. rOR JUSTICE AT NYU SCH. or LAW, 
WINNING CONSTRUCTION Jons rOR LOCAL RESIDENTS: A USER'S GUIDE POR COMMUNITY OR-
GANIZING CAMPAIGNS 16, 35 (2005), available at http://policyarchive.orgihandleII0207/bit 
streams/8709.pdf (steps include to "[clreate formal alliances with stakeholders" and "[glet a 
respected seat at the table," negotiate for conditions that support local jobs, implement the 
program, and "monitor outcomes and adjust practices"). 
35 Other examples include the Participatory Budgeting Project, which helps public and 
private institutions to develop New Governance procedures "in which local people directly 
decide how to spend part of a public budget" in order to "empower community members to 
make informed, democratic, and fair decisions about public spending and revenue." Mission 
& Approach, PNUICIPATORY BUDGETING PROJECT, http://www.participatorybudgeting.org/ 
who-we-are/mission-approachl (last visited May 24, 2013). Another example is a private con-
sulting company, which offers to help private- and public-sector clients "discover better ways 
412 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 7 
In its ideal form, New Governance offers a number of potential bene-
fits, many of which might seem especially appealing to those engaged in 
antipoverty efforts. The model supports the development of holistic, crea-
tive, cross-disciplinary, cross-jurisdictional, and cross-institutional solutions, 
which seem necessary to address complex problems like poverty36 and eco-
nomic developmentY New Governance theory also supports greater access 
to decision-making processes by marginalized groups, promoting their abil-
ity to influence law and policy and to help reform social-welfare programs to 
better respond to their needs. 
The model further suggests that participation by marginalized stake-
holders may be a partial answer to the need for greater accountability of 
institutions responsible for administering policy and programs affecting the 
poor. Such accountability is a long-standing concern among antipoverty 
scholars that is heightened by the diffusion of responsibility for traditionally 
public services through privatization. 38 
In addition, the New Governance approach offers an avenue for social-
justice reform that is unconstrained by the procedural and substantive hur-
dles of litigation.39 It also offers reform-oriented organizations a structured 
framework through which they can promote social-justice initiatives rather 
than relying on administrative bureaucracies and other traditional authorities 
to take the lead. 
On the other hand, the New Governance approach has some clear limi-
tations.40 Practically speaking, it incurs high implementation costS.41 Signif-
to solve social problems" by designing collaborations across sectors, engaging stakeholders, 
and setting up evaluation procedures. Our Approach to Impact, FSG, http://www.fsg.org/Our 
Approach/Overview.aspx (last visited May 24, 2013). 
3fi See Sabel & Simon, supra note 6. The need to better coordinate among antipoverty 
programs is also a long-standing one. See, e.g., Susan Bennett, The Threat (<f'the Wandering 
Poor: Wei/are Parochialism and Its Impact on the Use o/Housing Mobility as an Anti-Poverty 
Strategy, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1207, 1208 (1995) (discussing the conflicting goals between 
two key antipoverty strategies, income maintenance and assisted housing). 
'7 See Bingham, supra note 22, at 273-74 ("So-called 'wicked problems' such as environ-
mental degradation, urban economic development, and public health all challenged the capac-
ity of a single governmental unit operating in hierarchy .... This gave rise to the concept of 
governance, rather than government."); Sabel & Simon, supra note 6, at 89. 
3" For a discussion of the need for additional accountability in privatized welfare services, 
see Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era (<fPrivatized Welfare, 89 CALIF. L. 
Rnv. 569 (2001). 
'" Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enfbrcement, 92 MINN. L. REv. 434, 
438-39, 479 (2007) (describing a "strong consensus" among progressive scholars that many 
civil rights statutes "have not created as much social change as was originally hoped" and 
suggesting that New Governance "may ultimately challenge the assumption that litigation is 
the enforcement apparatus of choice."). 
40 For a comprehensive critique, see Super, supra note 5 (arguing that democratic experi-
mentalism makes six unfounded assumptions: that participants will agree on the problem and 
on government's role in solving it, are "inclined to act in a public-spirited way" to solve the 
problem, and will agree on reliable metrics for assessment; that time and transaction costs are 
not significant barriers to participation; and that national regulation is unnecessary). 
41 See Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure o/Ofler and Acceptance: Game Theory and the 
Law (<fContract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REv. 215, 226-27 (1990) (explaining that implemen-
tation costs are "the concrete costs of undertaking specific activities and are in principle di-
rectly measurable," as opposed to "strategic behavior costs," which are "losses suffered 
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icant investments of time, funding, expertise, and effort are necessary to 
support the robust participation by all stakeholders42 and to implement learn-
ing-by-doing proceduresY Even assuming that these elements are in place, 
grave concerns remain. One of the most serious concerns is that the New 
Governance model relies on the meaningful participation of marginalized 
stakeholders to improve outcomes and provide accountability, but has not 
articulated a theory of how to promote such participation in the face of sig-
nificant barriers.44 
B. The Problem of Cosmetic Participation 
"Meaningful participation" exists when the input provided significantly 
influences the outcome.45 While it is impossible to articulate the exact point 
at which participation becomes "meaningful," Sherry Arnstein conceived of 
a continuum that expressed different levels of int1uence that citizens might 
have through participatory processes.46 
At the "high" end of Arnstein's continuum, marginalized groups have 
control over decisionsY In the "middle" of the spectrum, they merely pro-
vide input and consultation without any assurance of intluence over the out-
come, which Arnstein describes as "tokenistic" participation.4~ In between 
these two is what Arnstein describes as a "[p]artnership that enables [citi-
zens] to negotiate and engage in trade-otIs with traditional power holders."49 
The New Governance model essentially provides for this in-between 
form of participation by providing a structure through which marginalized 
stakeholders can negotiate with more powerful actors. Where negotiating 
power among stakeholders is dramatically unequal, however, the concern is 
that the negotiations process will produce only tokenistic participation, since 
because bargainers have the incentive to maximize their individual gains rather than the total 
surplus from exchange"). 
42 Robust participation requires that all relevant stakeholders are identified, that their input 
is solicited, and that they offer sufficient input. But for many reasons, some of which are 
discussed infra in Part Ill, participation by poor people and other marginalized stakeholders in 
New Governance processes may be low. This article acknowledges both the difficulties and 
importance of ensuring robust participation by marginalized stakeholders, but does not specifi-
cally address those issues. Rather, it generally assumes the existence of robust participation 
and focuses primarily on how to make that participation meaningful. 
43 See Super, supra note 5, at 554-616. 
44 Nejaime, supra note 28, at 363 ("New Governance relies on a model of participation 
but has yet to elaborate ways for traditional outsiders to participate meaningfully in collabora-
tive governance regimes."). 
45 Audrey G. McFarlane, When Inclusion Leads to Exclusion: The Uncharted Terrain of' 
Community Participation in Economy Development, 66 BROOK L. REv. 861, 922 (2001), 
46 See Sherry R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Participation, 35 1. AM. INS!. PLANNERS 216, 217 
(1969). For a discussion of other frameworks for participation, see Bingham, supra note 22, at 
291-92. 
47 Arnstein, supra note 46, at 217. 
4" Id. 
4°Id. 
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the input of less powerful actors will be solicited, but with no assurance or 
likelihood that their input will influence the outcome.50 
When the input of marginalized stakeholders is solicited but does not 
int1uence the outcome, the participatory process is a merely cosmetic one. It 
provides a "thin veneer of symbolic conformance" with participatory-gov-
ernance principles, yet participants remain "unlikely to shift . . . existing 
dominant culture or norms of practice."51 
By definition, a cosmetic process invariably favors those already in 
power.52 Cosmetic processes not only fail to achieve good-governance aims, 
but affirmatively subvert them by "reinscrib[ing] existing power dynamics, 
allowing the 'haves' to come out ahead"53 and producing "a vicious cycle 
... tilting more and more entitlements in favor of those already in power."54 
Cosmetic processes can occur when participants have good intent, but 
can also result from deliberate abuse. When diverse viewpoints are purport-
edly invited but without intent to incorporate them into the outcome, a par-
ticipatory process merely becomes a means of legitimizing a preordained 
agenda.55 Powerful parties can thus use cosmetic processes to simply pro-
mote selfish interests, while giving the appearance that the outcome was 
vetted by and supported by a broad range of stakeholders. 
The risk that a participatory process will be merely cosmetic rises when 
poor people are involved, as they face particularly high barriers to meaning-
ful participation. As Wendy Bach explains, "the history of subordination 
and disproportionate power that characterizes social welfare history raises 
serious questions about the ability of poor communities to participate effec-
tively" in New Governance systems.56 The perspectives of poor people may 
be disregarded due to factors such as race, culture, income, and language; a 
lack of traditional markers of expertise such as educational or professional 
credentials; and a lack of other resources that provide influence and bargain-
ing advantagesY 
50 See Nejaime, supra note 28, at 362 C[P]articipatory structures may rhetorically in-
clude disempowered stakeholders but actually cede little or no power."). 
51 MARIAN BARNES ET AL., POWER, PARTICIPATION AND POLITICAL RENEWAL: CASE STUD-
IES AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 192 (2007). 
52 See generally Nejaime, supra note 28, at 347-63 (discussing how New Governance 
process might favor those in power). 
53Id. at 359. 
54 Lobel, supra note 6, at 458. 
55 See BARNES ET AL., supra note 51, at 192 (discussing "coercive isomorphism" and the 
likelihood that institutions may "go through the motions of public participation and involve-
ment because they are likely to be judged on their record of doing so"); Susan D. Carle, 
Progressive Lawyering in Politically Depressing Times: Can New Models filr Institutional 
SelrRefbrm Achieve More Effective Structural Change?, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 323, 
337-38 (2007); Nejaime, supra note 28, at 360 ("[New Governance] may offer a way to 
legitimate the insider group's agenda."); Super, supra note 5, at 556. 
50 Bach, Wellare Relorm, supra note 22, at 277. 
57 See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law 
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1100 (2004) (discussing how "the dynamics of 
unequal bargaining power" affect negotiations). 
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The harms of cosmetic processes are also multiplied when stakeholders 
are poor. Engaging in a New Governance system diverts scarce resources 
from other avenues of social-justice reform, and might even foreclose oppor-
tunities to challenge cosmetic outcomes.58 Furthermore, unfulfilled promises 
of empowerment and participation5Y are likely to lead to further distrust and 
only deepen the community's marginalization. 
Past experiments in participatory governance involving poor people in-
dicate the challenges at hand. Scholars point to the disappointing results of 
the Johnson Administration's War on Poverty, which gave poor people 
"maximum feasible participation" rights in federally funded antipoverty ini-
tiatives, but did not produce the kind of meaningful, sustained int1uence by 
poor people over antipoverty programs that many had hoped for. 60 Another 
familiar example is that zoning law generally provides for local stakeholder 
participation through mechanisms like open-meeting laws and citizen advi-
sory panels, yet poor neighborhoods have overwhelmingly been sacrificed to 
make way for urban renewal and gentrification projects.61 
That poor people have struggled to make a meaningful impact through 
participatory processes is not surprising, given that these processes ambi-
tiously rely on groups with little power to successfully challenge entrenched 
interests and institutions using only a negotiations framework that does not 
correct for power imbalances.62 New Governance envisions that participants 
with power will alter dominant norms and practice based on the input of 
those traditionally holding little or no int1uence. It asks powerful actors to 
share their power with marginalized groups, to overcome cognitive and other 
5" Nejaime, supra note 28, at 363 (arguing that cause lawyers might not participate in New 
Governance schemes out of concern that they cannot litigate the outcome if they have partici-
pated in the process). 
59 See Grainne de Burca, New Governance and Experimentalism: An Introduction, 2010 
WIS. L. REv. 227, 236 (arguing that "the democratic promise of New Governance is hollow"); 
Joel Handler et aI., A Roundtable on New Legal Realism, Microanalysis r<f1nstitutions, and the 
New Governance: Exploring Convergences and Diflerences, 2005 WIS. L. Rnv. 479, 510 
(describing cosmetic processes as a "charade" and "cruel"). 
60 See Wendy A. Bach, Mobilization and Poverty Law: Searching jbr Participatory De-
mocracy Amid the Ashes o{ the War on Poverty, 20 VA. J. Soc. POL'y & L. 96, 102 (2012) 
(,,[The War on Poverty] did not fully live up to its framers' vision, [but] it did have a signifi-
cant effect on the ability of communities to direct resources to their needs and to build organi-
zations and develop political leaders."); Super, supra note 5, at 570--74; see also Melish, supra 
note 19, at 17-18 (,,[The War on Poverty's] legacy continues to haunt current national debates 
on social welfare policy and poverty alleviation"). 
61 See, e.g., Barbara L. Bezdek, To Attain "The Just Rewards o{So Much Struggle": Lo-
cal-Resident Equity Participation in Urban Revitalization, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37, 55 (2006) 
(stating that in matters of urban development, participatory structures are inaccessible to poor 
residents); Patience A. Crowder, More Than Merely Incidental: Third-Party Beneficiary Rights 
in Urban Redevelopment Contracts, 17 GEO. 1. ON POVERTY L. & POL'y 287, 296 (2010); 
McFarlane, supra note 45, at 869. 
62 See Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves, 33 
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 503, 530 (2008) (book review) (critiquing New Governance scholars' 
"faith ... in the potential for new negotiated configurations of individual and collective inter-
ests to neutralize entrenched power hierarchies"). 
416 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 7 
biases that protect the status quo,63 and to sacrifice selfish interests in favor 
of policies that benefit less powerful groups or some notion of the "public 
good."64 
For these reasons and others, there is good reason to wonder whether 
participatory processes can produce significant change for poor people. 
Many consider participatory processes to be substantially less effective in 
effecting reform than adversarial, rights-claiming techniques,65 and further-
more view them as carrying too high a risk of co-optation and acquies-
cence.66 Given the range of reasons to reject participatory processes as a 
means of social-justice reform, it is not surprising that many scholars and 
advocates question the relevance of the New Governance movement. 
Regardless, the New Governance approach demands attention. The di-
vergent visions of the New Governance model require explanation, and if 
meaningful participation can be better promoted, the model may offer a pro-
ductive avenue for reform. Various case studies provide quantitative indica-
tions of improved outcomes.67 Further, whether one believes that New 
63 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 57, at 1075-76 (,,[E]mpirical psychology emphasizes 
that there are powerful cognitive tendencies toward entrenchment of the status quo."). 
64 See Saule T. Omarova, Rethinking the Future olSelrRegulation in the Financial Indus-
try, 35 BROOK. 1. INT'L L. 665, 701-03 (20 I 0) ("Of course, it may be argued that it is naiVe to 
expect self-interested private parties to impose voluntary limitations on their own profit-seek-
ing activities for the sake of the highly diffused and indeterminate public benefits."); see also 
McFarlane, supra note 45, at 926 (,,[I]f we apply Arnstein's logic today, what she seems to be 
saying is that participation inevitably leads to either a shift in power or to exclusion. And 
exclusion is more likely a natural or inevitable result because a shift in power so clearly threat-
ens to disrupt an otherwise settled, and often privatized, process."). 
65 See Jason M. Solomon, Law and Governance in the 21st Century Regulatory State, 86 
TEX. L. REv. 819, 850 (2008) (reviewing LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 
(Grainne de 8drca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006) and LISA HEINZERLING & MARK V. TUSHNET, 
THE REGULATORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE STAlE MATERIALS, CASES, COMMENTS (2006» 
("[I]f the new governance scholars are going to succeed in understanding the circumstances in 
which such schemes will work, they must ... account for the United States' culture of adver-
sarial legalism, where interests represented by lawyers clash, and lawyers use and attempt to 
shape the law to serve their clients' interests. For better or worse, these lawyers are generally 
not trying to work with others to reach the 'best' social outcome .... Rather, they are trying to 
advance their clients' interests in particular contexts."). 
66 See Scott L. Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering: Community Economic Development 
in the Figueroa Corridor, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 302, 303 (Austin Sarat 
& Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006) (arguing that collaborative negotiation models may lead to 
quiescence); Freeman, supra note 23, at 84-85 (,,[P]roviding access to groups who define 
themselves in terms of their outsider status might undermine their role as critics of the system. 
Some organizations will view the participation and responsibility that collaboration portends 
as ultimately disempowering."). 
67 Success can sometimes be measured empirically. See Lobel, supra note 6, at 418-19 
(citing workplace safety studies reporting an almost fifty percent reduction in incidents where 
New Governance methods were used); Susan Sturm, The Architecture r<f1nclusion: Advancing 
Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247, 286-87 (2006) 
(describing quantitative and qualitative indicators of increased opportunities for the profes-
sional advancement of women in the sciences as a result of New Governance process). In 
other cases, success may be implied by the fact that the process produced substantive reforms, 
or measured through studies focusing on the participation rates and satisfaction levels of 
marginalized groups. See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note I, at 330-31 (noting that data from a 
1995 community-policing initiative suggested that resident participation was highest among 
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Governance can improve outcomes or not, it remains that the New Govern-
ance approach is being widely implemented, and often in ways that are 
highly susceptible to abuse. One scholar writes of a contemporary "partici-
pation industry," a "proliferation of efforts by government, nongovernmen-
tal organizations, private sector businesses, and intergovernmental bodies to 
ensure" voice, stakeholder participation, inclusion, and self-help that have 
largely been "discredited as mere tokenism."68 Given the consequences of 
cosmetic processes, there is a need to further study the causes of cosmetic 
processes and to articulate a framework for better promoting meaningful 
participation. 
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR PROMOTING MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION 
To identify a theoretical framework for meaningful participation, it is 
helpful to first examine how existing New Governance theory addresses the 
matter. The following discussion suggests that the model can better protect 
against subversion and abuse if supplemented with a conceptual framework 
for providing stronger structural encouragement of meaningful participation. 
It locates a useful analogy in business transactions, articulating two baseline 
conditions that make it possible for business transactions to take place. 
These same conditions are shown to be relevant to court-based New Govern-
ance systems, which seek to establish these conditions as a means of struc-
turally promoting meaningful participation by marginalized parties. 
A. The Model's Approach to Meaningful Participation 
The New Governance model predicts that diverse participation will sur-
face conflict among stakeholders' competing interests, priorities, and points 
of view. To resolve this cont1ict, the model envisions stakeholders as engag-
ing in deliberative processes. 
Deliberative processes are rooted in Deweyan philosophy,6Y "a vener-
able, recently revived tradition of politics [holding] that justifying one's po-
sition by giving reasons and responding to reasoned arguments for 
competing views can alter a person's understanding of her factual circum-
stances and her interests, disclosing previously unseen opportunities."71l The 
poor people and that participants felt that sixty-four percent of problems raised were being 
addressed) . 
6" Melish, supra note 19, at 91. 
69 See William H. Simon, Solving Problems V.I'. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Chal-
lenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 127, 131 (2004). 
70 Sabel & Simon, supra note 57, at 1076. Dorf and Sabel offer an eloquent vision of how 
this might occur: 
[WJorkable, long-term collaboration can issue from, and aid the construction of, the 
institution of problem-solving deliberation itself. Facing urgent problems that none 
can solve alone and seeking methods of establishing joint accountability, parties will 
often prefer to explore a potential solution, even if they are unsure of its outcome, 
than to do nothing .... Once begun, pragmatic problem solving loosens the hold of 
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deliberative process involves reasoned contestation, which is meant to move 
participants toward developing a resolution "approximat[ing] a common 
interest. "71 
Ideally, under the model, deliberative processes lead to consensus by all 
stakeholders. Consensus does not guarantee that meaningful participation 
has occurred, especially when stakeholders with little negotiating power face 
those with significantly greater power. However, if consensus were required 
before participants could move forward with any proposed resolution, it 
would at least provide strong structural support for meaningful participation 
by all stakeholders, since it would provide even unempowered stakeholders 
with the ability to veto outcomes that inadequately incorporate their views. 
Deliberative processes and a mandate to arrive at consensus are, how-
ever, difficult to carry out. Simon and Sabel note that "[i]n practice, the 
extent to which deliberation occurs ... varies"72 and that for deliberations to 
succeed, "parties have to be capable of ... treating each other with respect 
and remaining open to learning. Clearly, these conditions are not satisfied 
invariably."73 Simon further recognizes the difficulty of inducing partici-
pants to transcend distributive bargaining,74 and other theorists similarly ac-
knowledge that it is generally infeasible to expect consensus.7) Consensus 
may be especially difficult to reach when marginalized stakeholders are in-
volved, as their participation is in fact intended to generate contestation and 
challenge the status quo. 
Consequently, the model does not mandate consensus, but rather em-
phasizes that participants should mightily strive toward consensus.76 Stake-
holders who sincerely strive toward consensus will, by definition, work very 
hard to accommodate and incorporate each other's input into any proposed 
solution.77 
However, the standard of striving toward consensus is extremely diffi-
cult to measure or enforce, and leaves open the door to cosmetic processes. 
For instance, participants can easily claim to strive toward consensus, while 
intentionally using the process to claim legitimacy for a preordained out-
come. Even well-intentioned participants may produce a cosmetic outcome 
interest by fitfully darting, as it were, beyond its reach, thereby discovering solutions 
bit by bit in the unfamiliar territory beyond the reach of bounded rationality and 
habitual calculations of advantage. 
Dorf & Sabel, supra note I, at 321-22. 
71 Sabel & Simon, supra note 57, at 1099. 
72 [d. at 1068. 
73 See Simon, supra note 69, at 206-07. 
74 [d. at 208-09. 
75 Dorf & Sabel, supra note I, at 288-89 C[E]xperimentalism does not pursue the chi-
mera of replacing conflict with consensus."). 
76 Consensus is generally viewed as the ideal standard. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 6, at 
378 (arguing that negotiated rulemaking is "ideally" achieved through consensus building); id. 
at 416 n.303 (noting that early OSHA New Governance processes "national consensus stan-
dards"); id. at 438 (describing other New Governance decision-making processes as "prima-
rily consensus based"). 
77 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 57, at 1068 ("[T]he consensus standard plays a valua-
ble role even when no consensus is reached."). 
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under this standard. When consensus is not reached, participants are still 
likely to feel pressure to produce a resolution, given the costs invested and 
likely publicity generated by a broadly inclusive participatory process. 
Under pressure to find a solution, participants may simply resort to a major-
ity vote to break the deadlock7X or choose the resolution approved by the 
more powerful stakeholders. Either choice is likely to exclude marginalized 
stakeholders' interests from consideration. 
If it is not feasible to mandate consensus and participants can only be 
asked to strive toward consensus, the risk of cosmetic processes is high. The 
aim, therefore, is to reduce this risk by seeking ways to encourage partici-
pants, through structural means, to strive toward defenses. 
In seeking to articulate a framework for structurally encouraging par-
ticipants to strive toward consensus, it is useful to consider other situations 
in which both conflict and consensus are presumed. While business transac-
tions may seem an unlikely source of inspiration for matters of governance, 
in this limited respect they provide a useful analogy. 
B. Structural Encouragement in Business Transactions: 
The Baseline Conditions 
Business transactions, like New Governance, presume that conflict will 
exist yet that parties will strive toward consensus. When parties contemplate 
a business transaction, they expect that each party will have cont1icting in-
terests to be negotiated but also that each will strive toward consensus on the 
business terms, since the business transaction will not move forward without 
it. What motivates business partners to strive toward consensus and over-
come conflict? 
Two conditions motivate those contemplating business transactions. 
First, the parties are each motivated toward a common goal. Second, each 
party recognizes what the other party contributes toward that goal. These 
two baseline conditions propel the parties to sincerely strive toward consen-
sus as they negotiate the terms of their business deal. 
A simple example illustrates these baseline conditions. When a car 
owner and a car mechanic begin negotiating, each is motivated toward the 
common goal of exchanging car repair services for payment. The parties 
have different motivations (the mechanic wants income and the owner wants 
a car that works), and they expect some conflict (most obviously, one wants 
a higher payment and one wants a lower payment). However, they share a 
common goal of exchanging services for payment, which motivates them to 
overcome any potential conflicts and come to agreement. 
The second baseline condition is that each party recognizes what the 
other party contributes toward the common goal. In the car repair context, 
OR See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 1, at 320 (describing democratic experimentalism as de-
liberative in that "decisions regarding the provision of services are normally made by means of 
reason giving through discussion. not (except in cases of deadlock) the counting of votes··). 
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the contributions of each party are obvious: the owner contributes payment, 
and the mechanic contributes expert services. 
Thus, this example illustrates that in business transactions, parties are 
motivated toward a common goal and recognize each other's contribution 
toward that goal. These conditions encourage the parties to sincerely strive 
toward consensus on the business terms. 
Contracts scholarship supports this premise. One scholar explains that 
"contracts plainly present cases of "joint intentional activity."79 Mel Eisen-
berg notes that "[a] bargain promise requires and embodies two choices by 
the promisor. First, the promisor must choose to achieve a certain objective. 
Second, the promisor must choose to achieve or further that objective by 
making a given bargain" with another party.so Similarly, James Henderson 
describes contract's "constitutive core" as the solving of problems by deal-
making: when parties attempt to solve a problem unilaterally, but realize 
that the solution "call[s] for the cooperation of other actors, the parties may 
engage in deal making to arrange for such mutual assistance."sl Two parties 
strive toward a contract, in other words, when each party understands its 
desire for a certain outcome, and recognizes that the other party can contrib-
ute toward that outcome. The two baseline conditions are thus the funda-
mental building blocks of business transactions. 
It is worth noting that both baseline conditions must exist, for if either 
condition is lacking, the parties simply won't engage. If the parties aren't 
motivated toward a common goal-the owner wants a dent fixed, for exam-
ple, and the mechanic only performs engine work-they see no point in 
working toward consensus. Parties who do not recognize the other party's 
contribution will also refuse to engage. A car owner will not negotiate terms 
of a lease with a mechanic who has a reputation for not doing a good job, for 
example. 
It should also be understood that while the baseline conditions are nec-
essary for the business deal to take place, they are certainly not sufficient to 
guarantee that it will. s2 The car owner and mechanic might be motivated to 
agree on a mutually satisfactory date for the work to be completed, for in-
stance, but for logistical reasons, may fail to find one. 
70 Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1456-57 (2004). 
80 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Mistake in Contract Law, 91 CAUL L. REV. 1573, 1581 
(2003). 
81 See James A. Henderson, Jr., Contract's Constitutive Core: Solving Problems by Mak-
ing Deals, 12 U. ILL. L. REv. 89, 94 (2012). 
82 This article focuses on the narrow question of the baseline, minimum, or threshold con-
ditions. Thus, a "theory of bargaining" that "predicts under what circumstances bargainers 
will be able to reach a cooperative outcome" through a New Governance process is outside the 
scope of this paper. See Katz, supra note 41, at 227. For a discussion of New Governance and 
behavioral economics, see On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral 
Economics TntcJrms Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2127-38 (2008) (reviewing 
RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, 
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) and DAN ARIELY, PREDICTADLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN 
FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008)). 
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Other factors might also thwart ultimate agreement. Over time, 
changed circumstances and information may reduce motivations. The car 
owner may lose motivation to contract with the mechanic, for example, if a 
friend offers to fix the car for free. A mechanic might be motivated to ac-
cept a job at first, but later realize that it requires expertise she does not 
have. 
Any number of explicit and implicit factors may affect even simple 
business decisions, such that even if the baseline conditions are in place to a 
certain degree, or at one point in time, the transaction may still ultimately 
fail to take place if motivations are not sufficiently strong or sustainable 
under changed circumstances. The baseline conditions are thus necessary, 
but not sufficient, to guarantee consensus on business terms. 
Moreover, even if the parties do reach consensus on the business terms, 
this fact alone is not sufficient to guarantee that the parties' primary interests 
will in fact be met. The car owner may ask the mechanic to do minimal 
repairs because it is all she can afford, even though she would be much 
better off with a car that is safer and more reliable. Consensus may not 
mean that all parties are in fact satisfied, but rather may be born from neces-
sary compromise. 83 
Therefore, even when the baseline conditions are established, this does 
not guarantee either that consensus will be reached or that the participants' 
needs will be adequately met. Yet the conditions are important to articulate 
precisely because they are the minimum or baseline conditions required to 
motivate the participants to seriously consider each other's needs and inter-
ests. In other words, these conditions are necessary for all parties to have 
the chance at meaningfully participating in the business negotiations; if the 
conditions are not present, meaningful participation will fail. 
Likewise, this article suggests that the same two baseline conditions 
must be in place before marginalized stakeholders can possibly participate 
meaningfully in New Governance processes. 
The next section illustrates in more detail the relationship between the 
baseline conditions and New Governance systems. It discusses how court-
based systems promote the two baseline conditions to encourage meaningful 
participation in negotiations between marginalized plaintiffs and more pow-
erful defendants. 
C. Structural Encouragement in Court-Based New Governance Systems 
In their seminal work, Destabilization Rights, William Simon and 
Charles Sabel analyzed lawsuits involving plaintiffs from archetypically 
marginalized groupS.~4 The plaintiffs in these cases included developmen-
tally disabled individuals bringing claims against institutions charged with 
83 Even the achievement of consensus does not indicate that all stakeholders have mean-
ingfully participated. See generally Cohen, supra note 62. 
84 Sabel & Simon, supra note 57, at 1021. 
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their daily care, prisoners suing prison officials, public-school students 
bringing discrimination suits against school systems, members of the public 
alleging police abuse, and public-housing residents and other low-income 
housing activists suing local government agencies.85 
In these cases, the courts have tended toward an experimentalist ap-
proach that emphasizes litigants negotiating their own remedial plans, rather 
than issuing top-down, judicially fashioned remedies.86 This process ac-
tively promotes the same two baseline conditions needed for business trans-
actions to move forward. In these court cases, the baseline conditions 
encourage the meaningful participation of marginalized plaintiffs in the de-
sign of the remedial plan. 
The first baseline condition is that the parties must be motivated toward 
a common goal, just as the car owner and mechanic are both motivated to 
get the car fixed. In "destabilization" cases, however, the parties arrive in 
court precisely because they want different, mutually exclusive outcomes: 
each side has a starkly contrasting vision of the relationship between the 
defendant and the plaintiff. The liability finding in favor of the plaintiff, 
however, changes this. In Sabel and Simon's terms, the liability finding cre-
ates "destabilizing,"87 "disentrenching,"88 or "unsettl[ing]"89 effects that 
"induce the [defendant] to reform itself in a process in which it must re-
spond to previously excluded stakeholders."91l In other words, the liability 
finding radically changes the defendant's goal91 from one at odds with the 
plaintiff's goal to one consistent with it. The new goal shared by the parties 
is to agree upon a remedy that will gain approval by the court. 
In addition to creating a shared goal where none previously existed, the 
court process also imposes strong motivations for the recalcitrant party to 
achieve this goal. The court could reject a proposed plan for inadequately 
ret1ecting the plaintiff's interests and instead impose a receivership or court-
defined remedial plan. As Simon and Sabel suggest, the uncertainty inherent 
in those alternatives strongly motivates the defendant to work toward con-
sensus on the remedial plan.92 
The second condition necessary to promote meaningful participation is 
that the participants recognize the value of the others' contributions to the 
common goal. In the context of business deals, a party easily recognizes 
how the other contributes to the business deal. In destabilization cases, the 
parties' arrival in court indicates that the defendant, in fact, little values the 
85 See id. at 1022, 1029, 1034, 1043, 1047. 
86Id. at 1067-68. 
87Id. at 1055 (terminology attributed to ROBERTO MANGABElRA UNGER, FALSE NECES-
SITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE or RADICAL DEMOCRACY 530 
(1987)). 
88Id. at 1074-82. 
89 Id. at 1062. 
90Id. at 1056. 
91 "The court's principal contribution is to indicate publicly that the status quo is illegiti-
mate and cannot continue." Id. 
92 Sabel & Simon, supra note 6, at 53. 
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plaintiff's views. But again, the court process changes this. The liability 
finding gives credence to the plaintiff's views, and makes it patently obvious 
to the defendant that plaintiff's interests must be incorporated into the reme-
dial plan. 
While the court-based system promotes the two baseline conditions, the 
process of negotiating a remedial plan in these cases obviously remains 
fraught and difficult. The liability finding does not mean that the defendant 
adopts the plaintiff's interests as its own out of either newfound respect or 
concern for the plaintiff's position; it merely changes the defendant's self-
interest so that it is newly aligned with the plaintiff's interest.Y3 The baseline 
conditions thus do not erase antagonism or guarantee that consensus will be 
reached, that meaningful participation will occur, or that the marginalized 
party's concerns will be adequately addressed.Y4 
Nevertheless, the baseline conditions remain critical to the integrity of 
the New Governance process. In other words, if the court process did not 
work to promote these baseline conditions, meaningful participation in these 
instances would surely fail. The support of the baseline conditions makes it 
at least possible for meaningful participation to succeed. 
IV. PROMOTING MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION OUTSIDE OF THE COURTS 
If the baseline conditions necessary for business transactions are pro-
moted by court-based New Governance systems, can those same conditions 
be promoted outside the courtroom? This question is important because 
outside the courtroom, New Governance-style systems abound, yet the risk 
of cosmetic processes is especially high. 
In part, this is due to the fact that those promulgating New Governance 
systems outside the courtroom, such as legislatures, administrative agencies, 
and private organizations, lack the courts' extraordinary power to coerce par-
ticipants into striving toward consensus. New Governance systems imple-
mented outside the courtroom generally lack one central "architect" who 
wields coercive power over all participants, which may include a diverse 
array of public and private institutions as well as individuals and members of 
the public at large. Yet case studies suggest that at least under some circum-
stances, the New Governance model can be applied to create collective ac-
tion by these diverse stakeholders to make change based in part on the input 
of traditionally marginalized and unempowered groups. 
The baseline conditions provide a useful conceptual framework for un-
derstanding how meaningful participation can be promoted in New Govern-
93 This is an example of interest convergence. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Unintended 
Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1053, 1056 (2005) ("The 
interest of blacks in achieving racial justice is accommodated only when and for so long as 
policymakers find that the interest of blacks converges with the political and economic inter-
ests of whites."). 
94 See discussion on baseline conditions supra Part I1LB. 
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ance systems taking place outside the courtroom. The following discussion 
draws on a variety of proposals intended to promote meaningful participa-
tion, and frames and analyzes these proposals according to how they support 
the baseline conditions.95 While this discussion is not exhaustive of all 
means of promoting meaningful participation, it conceptually categorizes the 
most prominent of these ideas, discusses their relevance to the baseline-con-
ditions framework, and discusses certain of their limits and benefits. It then 
analyzes a few short case studies to demonstrate how some of these ideas 
have been applied, and draws some broader lessons about what may be nec-
essary to prevent cosmetic processes and encourage meaningful participation 
outside of the courts. 
A. Promoting Baseline Condition One: Defining a Common Goal 
and Motivations Toward It 
There are three general means of promoting the first baseline condition, 
or motivation toward a common goal. As discussed below, participants can 
become motivated to work toward a common goal when a "destabilizing" 
event occurs. Participants might also define their own goals and motiva-
tions, if supported by mechanisms that elicit meaningful input and facilitate 
conflict resolution. The architect of a participatory process may also define 
the common goal, along with incentives for participants to achieve it. 
1. Destabilizing Event Creates a Common Goal and Motivations 
The defining characteristic of a destabilizing event is that it indicates to 
stakeholders that the status quo is no longer acceptable and that they must 
pursue change.96 In the lawsuits studied by Sabel and Simon, the liability 
finding served as the destabilizing event that defined a common goal shared 
by both defendant and plaintiff where no common goal previously existed. 
Outside the courtroom, other kinds of destabilizing incidents may serve the 
same purpose. In Cincinnati, for example, a series of tragic shootings and 
other tensions between police and residents culminated in three days of vio-
lent protests. Environmental calamities may have been instrumental in in-
spiring New Governance procedures to address natural-resources concerns.97 
Destabilizing events can provide motivations to work toward a common 
goal, which is the first of the two baseline conditions necessary to spur par-
95 These proposals include ideas implemented in practice as well as scholarly prescriptions 
for future implementation, and are abstracted from sources analyzing both New Govern-
ance-style systems and the urban-development process, which is not a New Governance pro-
cess but relevant in that it is a participatory system. 
96 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 57, at 1074-82 (stating that one of the six effects of 
destabilizing litigation is that "the liability determination reverses the normal presumption in 
favor of the status quo"). 
97 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Getting to "Let's Talk"; Legal and Natural Destabilizations 
and the Future r<fRegional Collaboration, 8 NEV. LJ. 811 (2008). 
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tlclpants to strive toward consensus. Destabilizing events, while often 
tragic, therefore can help to create fruitful opportunities for problem solving. 
2. Participants Define a Common Goal and Motivations 
The first baseline condition needed to promote meaningful participa-
tion, motivation toward a common goal, might also be promoted by enhanc-
ing the opportunities for marginalized stakeholders to provide input and 
engage with other stakeholders. Proposals for enhanced participation of 
stakeholders commonly include holding more public meetings,Y~ soliciting 
testimony by individual citizens on a massive scale,Y9 and using broad 
surveys or polls to gather input. IIIO Others include imposing heightened 
transparency measures, such as strong sunshine laws,lol and requiring that 
agendas, issues, and proposals be published for review and comment. 11l2 
This approach seeks to promote the definition of a common goal 
through enhanced participation procedures. The premise underlying this ap-
proach is that if stakeholders are well informed and given ample opportuni-
ties to participate, they will come to the table with more ideas and 
perspectives, engage with each other, and eventually be able to identify a 
common goal toward which all are motivated. This approach ultimately re-
lies on participants engaging in deliberative processes to uncover common 
ground. However, deliberative processes are more likely to succeed if par-
ticipants actively engage with each other rather than simply trade informa-
tion. More promising approaches, therefore, include face-to-face meetings 
of small groups of participants to better foster two-way engagement and dia-
logue l03 and the use of alternative-dispute-resolution systems to facilitate 
conflict resolution. 104 
9" See Damon Y. Smith, Participatory Planning and Procedural Protections: The Case 
jbr Deeper Public Participation in Urban Redevelopment, 29 ST. LouIS U. PUB. L. REv. 243, 
262 (2009). 
99 See Melish, supra note 19, at 79 (describing the testimony of ten thousand individuals 
as part of South Africa's hearings on poverty). 
100 See, e.g., Simmons, supra note I. 
lOJ See Patience A. Crowder, "Ain't No Sunshine": Examining Infbrmality and State Open 
Meetings Acts as the Anti-Public Norm in Inner-City Redevelopment Deal Making, 74 TENN. 
L. REV. 623 (2007). Proposals for transparency also support mobilization. See inlra Part 
IV.B.2. 
102 See Bach, Governance, supra note 22, at 295; see also Chester L. Mirsky & David 
Porter, Ambushing the Public: The Socio-Political and Legal Consequences of SEQRA Deci-
sion-Making, 6 ALD. L. ENVTL. OUlUlOK 1. I (2002). 
103 See Kruse, supra note 33, at 716; see also Elizabeth A. Kirk & Kirsty L. Blackstock, 
Enhanced Decision Making: Balancing Public Participation Against "Better Regulation" in 
British Environmental Permitting Regimes, 23 J. ENVTL. L. 97, 109 (2011) ("With the best 
will in the world the regulator may fail to understand the significance of information or values 
presented to it through these processes and better understandings may only truly develop 
through processes involving dialogue between interested parties."); McFarlane, supra note 45, 
at 880-84 (discussing limitations of public hearings that provide only "one-way participation" 
yet are deemed legally sufficient). 
J04 But see Cohen, supra note 62, at 504 (raising challenges to the suggestion by "both 
negotiation and new governance theorists ... that individual interest-bearers, instilled with the 
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For example, a city seeking ideas on how to best make use of a large 
downtown property recently vacated by a manufacturer might broadly solicit 
input from residents, business owners, educational leaders, city agencies, 
foundations, and others. Using the approach of encouraging participants to 
define their own goals, the city would offer ample opportunities for partici-
pation and two-way engagement, and conduct the process with transparency. 
The aspiration would be that through discussion and debate, these stakehold-
ers will define a common goal or set of goals for the property. 
The primary benefit of this approach is that participants come to their 
own definition of the goal, which is valued as local stakeholders have unique 
knowledge of the problem and of possible solutions and also of what might 
motivate them to work toward any particular goal. However, given that the 
deliberative state is so difficult to achieve, and given the level of conflict 
anticipated when marginalized stakeholders participate, substantial invest-
ments of time and other resources are likely to be necessary to facilitate 
participants' use of the deliberative process. Furthermore, such investments 
may still be insufficient to enable stakeholders to define common goals to-
ward which they are all motivated. 
3. Architect Imposes a Common Goal 
A third possibility for promoting the first baseline condition, motivation 
toward a common goal, is for a New Governance architect to define the 
common goal for the participants along with motivations toward that goal. 
The primary benefit of this approach is that it can be used where participants 
cannot agree on a common goal. 
For example, the California Legislature might pass a law mandating 
better occupational safety. The state agency tasked with carrying out this 
goal might in turn impose responsibility for this goal primarily on employers 
and unions. In this instance, by setting the goal of increased workplace 
safety, the legislature and the state agency together defined a common goal 
for employers and unions to work toward. 
In employing this approach, architects must take care to avoid replica-
tion of a command-and-control structure and to promote decentralized prob-
lem solving driven by local stakeholders. Toward this end, architects should 
define "framework" goals only.llls A framework goal would ask participants 
to find ways to "increase workplace safety," for instance, rather than impos-
ing specifically prescriptive actions such as "reduce hours worked and in-
crease training." In other words, architects should refrain from defining 
specific methods of achieving the goals, and instead allow stakeholders to 
tailor solutions to local conditions. 106 Architects should also define tentative 
proper configuration of dialogic and problem-solving skills, can, through negotiation, combine 
their interests with the interests of others in ways that reconfigure extant power hierarchies"). 
\05 Sabel & Simon, supra note 6, at 79. 
106 See Ford, supra note 3, at 480 n.148 (distinguishing between promoting participation 
and prescribing specific outcomes). 
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standards for assessment. This assists in setting expectations for what the 
participants should be striving toward, providing measures to hold partici-
pants accountable, and reducing the risk that the participants will undermine 
the substantive goal by setting only very weak assessment measures. I07 
4. Architect Creates Motivations 
The first baseline condition is not only that a common goal must be 
defined, but that the parties must also be motivated to strive toward it. Moti-
vation must be created when an architect imposes a common goal that isn't 
chosen by the participants themselves. Even when motivations surface 
through destabilizing events or through the participants' own definition of 
their goals, additional incentives to work hard to achieve the goal are likely 
necessary. 
The need to establish motivation toward the goal is especially strong in 
systems taking place outside of the courtroom, where stakeholders are often 
not captive. Accordingly, proposals for creating incentives abound. Some 
of the more prominent motivators are soft motivators, "hybridity," and pen-
alty defaults. 
Soft motivators encourage the voluntary pursuit of the stated goal. 
Grant funding can be a potent soft motivator. So can the relaxation of regu-
latory oversight. When workplace-safety records improve through voluntary 
efforts, for example, OSHA releases employers from more invasive agency 
oversight. loR 
Other motivators may involve more coercive power. The theory of 
"hybridity" explored by David and Louise Trubek suggests that New Gov-
ernance methods are especially effective when the goal toward which the 
parties are striving implicates "hard law" rights.lo9 Many New Governance 
case studies involve participatory processes that occurred in the shadow of 
litigation, where lawsuits had already been filed, as in Cincinnati, or where 
lawsuits had not yet been filed but conceivably might have been. Setting 
framework goals backed up by hard rights can thus motivate participants to 
work toward that goal. 
107 Sabel & Simon, supra note 6, at 79. Assessment measures can reduce the risk of 
abuse. See Cameron Holley, Facilitating Monitoring, Subverting Selrlnterest and Limiting 
Discretion: Learning From "New" Forms r<f'Accountability in Practice, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. 
L. 127, 206-07 (20 I 0) (arguing that where only general outcomes are specified, additional 
accountability mechanisms are required to thwart abuse). 
\08 See Lobel, supra note 6, at 418. 
109 See David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regulation: 
Complementarity, Rivalry, and Tranlj()rmation, 13 COLUM. 1. EUR. L. 539, 541 (2007) (dis-
cussing "hybrid system[s] in which innovation, negotiation and self-monitoring are fore-
grounded, while regulatory enforcement remains in the background as a default option"); see 
also Arnold S. Rosenberg, Motivational Law, 56 Cuw. ST. L. REV. III, 114 (2008) (discuss-
ing that "motivational law" can increase compliance with "regulatory" or hard law). For a 
discussion of the use of hard law in New Governance systems as too constricting of local 
discretion, see Lobel, supra note 6, at 382. 
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"Penalty defaults" can also function as motivators. In the context of 
destabilization lawsuits, if litigants fail to agree on an appropriate remedial 
plan, the court can impose its own plan, a default so unappealing that it 
effectively penalizes participants failing to come to agreement on their 
own. 111I Outside of the courtroom, environmental law provides an example: 
under the Endangered Species Act, if developers and environmental organi-
zations fail to negotiate an agreement concerning a sensitive habitat, no de-
velopment can occur in that area. III 
In sum, the first baseline condition-motivation toward a common 
goal-can be established outside the courtroom in at least three ways: 
through a destabilizing event, through facilitated deliberation by the partici-
pants, and as imposed by an architect. 
B. Promoting Baseline Condition Two: Recognition of the Marginalized 
Stakeholder's Contributions 
The second baseline condition is that participants recognize the contri-
bution of other participants toward achieving their common goal. This con-
dition must exist, along with the first baseline condition, in order for 
meaningful participation to be possible. 
In some situations, marginalized stakeholders offer expertise that is rel-
atively easy for others to recognize. Factory-floor workers have obvious 
expertise in how their own workplace might be made safer. Patients can 
speak with authority on how to improve the experience of those under the 
care of a medical clinic. 
In part, the contributions of the marginalized stakeholders in these situ-
ations are obvious because the goals-improving workplace-safety records 
and improving patient care-are defined with their interests in mind. When 
the goal is properly defined so as to be common to all stakeholders, the goal 
incorporates the interests of marginalized stakeholders, which in turn can 
raise the value of their input. A properly defined goal (part of the first base-
line condition) can thus make it easier for others to recognize their contribu-
tions toward that goal (the second baseline condition). 
As discussed supra in Part III, however, marginalized-stakeholder ex-
pertise is often contested. Intended beneficiaries of social-welfare programs, 
for example, are uniquely qualified to opine on how to make those programs 
more useful in meeting their needs,1I2 yet their voices are largely excluded 
from discussions about the design of antipoverty initiatives. I 13 
There are at least three ways to encourage other participants to recog-
nize the contributions of marginalized stakeholders where this recognition 
110 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 57, at 1067. 
111 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 6, at 91. 
112 See id. at 89. 
III See Bach, Governance, supra note 22, at 239 ("[TJhe absence of substantive participa-
tion by poor communities in goal-setting and program design fundamentally undermines the 
experimentalist enterprise."). 
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does not otherwise exist: the use of proxies, mobilization or community or-
ganizing, and the definition of a specific weight to be afforded to the input of 
those stakeholders. 
1. Proxies 
New Governance case studies indicate a reliance on formal organiza-
tional representatives to stand in for direct participation by marginalized 
stakeholders. California's occupational safety agency, for example, relies on 
unions to represent workers. I 14 In the case of Wisconsin's innocence reform 
initiative, lawyers from the Innocence Project advocated on behalf of wrong-
fully convicted individuals. In practice, nonprofit organizations are often 
considered as representing the needs of poor individuals. 
Proxies make New Governance processes more feasible by reducing the 
costs and other logistical challenges of soliciting direct participation. Fur-
thermore, proxy representatives may already have stature at the bargaining 
table, holding educational and professional credentials valued by other par-
ticipants. Nonprofits and organizations like unions also have legal structures 
suggesting that they represent stakeholder interests. 
On the other hand, proxies lack the direct experience that stakeholders 
themselves offer and that the New Governance model so deeply values. 
Proxies may not adequately represent the stakeholders' interests, I 15 are sus-
ceptible to co-optation and acquiescence, and can be even "less inclusive 
and less broadly accountable" than the government. 1l6 
Given these limitations, reliance on the use of proxies in New Govern-
ance must be carefully considered. To compensate for the lack of direct 
stakeholder participation, funding or structural support can be provided to 
encourage proxies to engage directly with stakeholders and promote ade-
quate representation of their interests. As a check on proxy representation, 
New Governance systems might also build in periodic consultation with the 
stakeholders directly, or solicit impact statements by stakeholders who ob-
ject to the proxies' representation. ll7 
2. Mobilization 
Community organizing or mobilization is another means of persuading 
other participants to recognize a marginalized group's contribution. I IX Since 
114 See Lobel, supra note 6, at 418. 
115 See Lisa T. Alexander, The Promise and Perils of' "New Regionalist" Approaches to 
Sustainable Communities, 38 FORDHAM URD. L.J. 629, 657-58 (2011) C[Sltakeholder repre-
sentatives, however, may not be as attentive to the concerns of grassroots or politically-activist 
stakeholders."). 
116 Simon, supra note 69, at 177. 
117 See Alexander, supra note 115, at 657-58 (discussing the use of proxies in the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development's Sustainable Communities program). 
118 The literature on mobilization is extensive. For discussions particularly relevant to this 
context, see Bach, Welfare Ref()rm, supra note 22, at 316 (describing community-based grass-
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mobilization emphasizes giving voice to marginalized individuals them-
selves as representatives of their own communities, it is strongly preferred 
over the use of proxies, which raises significant concerns about co-optation, 
capture, or inauthentic representation. 
Mobilization can combat skepticism about the group's credibility 
through the demonstration of numerosity. Numerosity is critical to credibil-
ity, since to be deemed legitimate contributors to a problem-solving process, 
marginalized individuals usually must demonstrate that they represent a col-
lective perspective, rather than self-interested or opportunistic viewpoints. I 19 
Mobilization, especially in large numbers, also indicates political 
power, which may persuade other participants to listen. It can draw atten-
tion to the issues and attract more well-established or well-resourced allies, 
further increasing the group's influence. 120 
New Governance architects seeking to promote meaningful participa-
tion might thus seek out circumstances in which mobilization has already 
occurred. New Governance architecture can also incorporate broader partic-
ipation and transparency measures, as described in Part IV.A.2, which may 
support mobilization and larger turnouts of better-informed stakeholders. 
More direct support for mobilization as a means of convincing partici-
pants of the value that marginalized stakeholders bring to the table would 
include funding and training for organizing efforts. 121 Such support must 
also be accompanied by adequate time for mobilization to take root. 122 
Where marginalized groups are already organized or where an urgent call to 
roots organizing as the "best hope for capturing and amplifying the opinions, needs, and goals 
of poor communities as well as exercising the power necessary to communicate and negotiate 
for these needs"); David Dominguez, Getting Beyond Yes to Collaborative Justice: The Role of 
Negotiation in Community Lawyering, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'y 55 (2005); Julissa 
Reynoso, Putting out Fires Befbre They Start: Community Organizing and Collaborative Gov-
ernance in the Bronx, U.S.A., 24 LAW & INEQ. J. 213 (2006); Bach, supra note 60, at 53. 
119 See Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance: Lessons From 
Chicago's Public Housing Relorm Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'y 117 (2009); 
see also Georgette C. Poindexter, Who Gets the Final No? Tenant Participation in Public 
Housing Redevelopment, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 659 (2000). 
12() Mobilization, especially that undertaken in the style proposed by Saul Alinsky, is not 
undertaken with the purpose of collaboratively working toward a common goal, but as a means 
of contestation. For this reason, mobilization may seem a poor fit for New Governance, which 
is frequently described as a "collaborative" process. Ideally, however, contestation within a 
New Governance system leads to a changing of the goal to one that better meets the interest of 
all stakeholders. See also Lobel, supra note 6, at 461 n.547. 
121 See Simon, supra note 69, at 208 ("Another alternative intervention would be to 
strengthen weaker parties directly, say, by transferring resources organizing assistance."); 
Alastair R. Lucas, Canadian Participatory Rights in Energy Resource Development: The 
Bridges to Empowerment?, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 195, 199 (2004). 
122 See Mariana Hernandez Crespo, Building the Latin America We Want: Supplementing 
Representative Democracies With Consensus-Building, 10 CARDOZO J. CONTI,[CT RESOL. 425, 
490 (2009) (citing the "difficulties of organizing a representative and accountable citizens' 
group in the face of futility, alienation, and distrust."); see also Cohen, supra note 62, at 544 
("[Some New Governance critics'] participatory projects appear driven by the conviction that 
the interests of excluded populations must be sufficiently politicized through (if necessary, 
contentious) collective action before they can become subject to legal/problem-solving 
processes."). 
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action is possible, the mobilization process may be relatively quick, but in 
many situations, effective mobilization may take significant time. 
Before relying on mobilization as a primary means of promoting recog-
nition of marginalized groups' contributions, it must be carefully considered 
whether organizing has already taken root within that community, whether 
additional efforts are supportable through funding and training, and whether 
there is sufficient time for effective organizing to take place before the par-
ticipatory process begins. 
3. Architect Affords Certain Weight to Participants' Input 
A third means of recognizing marginalized stakeholders' contributions 
is the use of rules that afford a specific measure of weight to their input. 
A potent version of this concept would require consensus by all stake-
holders on key decision points. 123 Its strongest expression would place deci-
sion-making power in the hands of marginalized groups. While either 
mandating consensus or giving control to marginalized groups may seem 
unlikely, in some cases these may be options. For example, patients hold the 
majority of board seats of federally funded community health centers.124 
Similarly, community-controlled groups might be given the right to monitor 
how well private contractors administer social-welfare programs.125 
If such options are not available, however, a New Governance system 
may include weaker versions of this proposal. It may mandate, for example, 
that the input of marginalized stakeholders must "materially impact" a deci-
sion,126 or require that outsider input be afforded "great weight."127 Propos-
als along these lines often include exceptions for "feasibility"12X or are 
otherwise difficult to enforce. To be effective in promoting the recognition 
of marginalized groups' contributions, the abuse of such standards must be 
discouraged by drawing any exceptions narrowly, imposing a high burden of 
proof to show both that the standard is met and that any exception is war-
ranted, and carefully scrutinizing claims for exceptions. 
C. Illustrations 
The preceding sections discuss various ways in which the two baseline 
conditions may be established outside the courtroom in order to promote 
123 But see supra Part III.A (noting that consensus does not guarantee meaningful 
participation). 
124 See Campbell, supra note 2, at 398. 
125 See Bach, Governance. supra note 22, at 294, 317-18 (suggesting that "community-
controlled monitoring bodies" may increase the accountability of privatized welfare services); 
Bach, Wellare Relorm, supra note 22, at 317-24. 
126 Smith, supra note 98, at 262. 
127 See, e.g., OFFICE OF ZONING, Gov'T OF D.C., ZONING IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
(20 II) (requiring the Board of Zoning Appeals to give "great weight" to the opinion of Advi-
sory Neighborhood Councils, which are made up of community members, as to whether cer-
tain exceptions to the zoning law should be permitted in any particular case). 
128 See Smith, supra note 98, at 262. 
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meaningful participation by marginalized stakeholders.129 This section illus-
trates how such proposals have played out in particular factual contexts. 
The first example returns to Cincinnati's police-reform initiative, in 
which each of the baseline conditions was promoted in multiple different 
ways. The first baseline condition, motivation toward a common goal, was 
established through a combination of destabilizing events, hybridity, penalty 
defaults, and architect-imposed goals. 
Three days of violent protests acted as a destabilizing event that pro-
pelled stakeholders to understand that they shared a common goal of 
preventing further violence on the part of both the police and African Ameri-
can protestors. This destabilizing event also perhaps functioned as a penalty 
default, motivating participants to find a solution in order to avoid further 
protests and police shootings. 
Hybridity was also at work in Cincinnati. The New Governance pro-
cess took place in the shadow of litigation filed on behalf of marginalized 
stakeholders. A "framework goal" of preventing the abuse of police 
power l3O had already been established by a federal statute prohibiting unlaw-
ful police patterns or practices, 131 which may have further encouraged par-
ticipants to move toward that goal. It is likely that the possibility of 
litigation served in Cincinnati as a "penalty default." 
The second baseline condition, the recognition of the contributions of 
the marginalized participants, was also established through various means. 
The marginalized stakeholders, African American residents, were clearly in-
strumental to the common goal of ending the violence. The residents also 
gained recognition through the use of mass participation methods, like the 
surveys. Meetings with small groups of stakeholders also likely helped to 
legitimize the residents' positions and provide dialogue.132 
Proxies also played a significant role. African American residents were 
represented by the United Black Front and the American Civil Liberties 
Union of Ohio Foundation, which had brought suit as formal representatives 
of the class and continued to play pivotal roles as proxies during the 
negotiations. 133 
In addition, while these negotiations were voluntary pretrial negotia-
tions, not mandated by a liability finding, the backdrop of the litigation af-
forded the proxies a specific amount of weight in the decision making, since 
their approval was necessary in order to settle the litigation. All of these 
approaches served to legitimize the contribution of the marginalized 
stakeholders. 
129 Appendix I provides a summary in table form. 
130 While the federal statute itself does not conform to New Governance principles, see 
Simmons, supra note 1, at 416-18, that is immaterial to this discussion as the New Govern-
ance process was not initiated pursuant to this statute but was initiated and designed by the 
stakeholders themselves. 
131 See id. at 393. 
132 See id. at 425. 
m Collaborative Agreement, supra note 13, para. 1. 
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In short, the Cincinnati example demonstrates the use of nearly all of 
the prominent means of promoting the baseline conditions necessary for 
meaningful participation to take place. Another illustration of how the two 
baseline conditions can be established outside of the courtroom is provided 
by the gender-diversity initiative among science and engineering faculty at 
the University of Michigan, as discussed by Susan Sturm. 
In this case, several different architects helped to affirmatively define 
the goal of increasing gender diversity and to impose it on local stakeholders 
and the university employees and administrators. Congress had authorized 
an independent federal science agency to provide grant funding for partici-
pating universities. 134 The science agency made individual universities, such 
as Michigan, sign a contract setting forth the framework goals and worked 
with the universities to set appropriate assessment measures. 135 The Univer-
sity of Michigan then made the goal relevant to its administrators and em-
ployees. In part, the Michigan initiative did so by framing the promotion of 
gender diversity as aligned with "core institutional values,"136 such as the 
advancement of science, which served to emphasize how the goal of diver-
sity was in fact common to all stakeholders. 
A form of hybridity may also have been at work. Courts and legisla-
tures had previously set framework goals of gender equality in the work-
place, which may have reinforced for the universities, administrators, and 
perhaps even some employees that the goal of gender diversity was common 
to their interests of avoiding discrimination lawsuits.137 
In terms of establishing the second baseline condition-the recognition 
of the marginalized stakeholders' contribution to the process-the signifi-
cance of input by women was also made clear to the other stakeholders, 
given the nature of the goal itself. Aligning gender diversity with core insti-
tutional interests, such as the overall advancement of science, further re-
duced "backlash" from potentially hostile stakeholdersm and made it easier 
for women to advocate for change. 13Y This illustrates how the proper defini-
tion of a common goal can support the recognition of the marginalized 
stakeholders' contributions. 
In addition, the university used proxies such as experts on gender and 
race, as well as deans and other administrators, who were able to promote 
women's interests because they had "knowledge, int1uence, and credibil-
ity."14o The university also supported direct stakeholder input from women 
through surveys and focus groups,141 as well as through confidential chan-
nels of communication. 142 
\34 Sturm, supra note 67, at 272-73. 
\35 ld. at 314-15. 
136 [d. at 302-03. 
137 [d. at 305. 
\38Id. at 308-09. 
\3<) ld. at 310. 
14() [d. at 283-84, 287. 
141 [d. at 284-85. 
142 ld. at 291. 
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D. Active and Passive Promotion of Meaningful Participation 
The preceding analysis suggests some important lessons about promot-
ing meaningful participation outside of the courtroom. In short, the case 
studies echo the theoretical analysis of Part III and its conclusion that struc-
tural support for meaningful participation is needed to overcome the conflict 
inherent to New Governance systems and other barriers faced by marginal-
ized stakeholders. Further, while the approaches to promoting meaningful 
participation range from relatively passive approaches to very active ones, 
the case studies strongly indicate that passive approaches alone are unlikely 
to be sufficient. The recognition that meaningful participation by marginal-
ized stakeholders does not inevitably occur, but requires intervention, is an 
important one as it is frequently overlooked, leaving the model susceptible 
to producing merely cosmetic processes. 
A review of the approaches to establishing the baseline conditions 
reveals a distinction between passive and active promotion of meaningful 
participation. A passive architect, for example, might seek to institute a 
New Governance system where both baseline conditions already exist and 
where no affirmative act on the part of the architect is necessary to establish 
the conditions. Such an architect might seek out situations where a destabi-
lizing event has surfaced a common goal and where marginalized stakehold-
ers are already adequately represented by proxies or well mobilized. 
Such a confluence of conditions is likely to be rare, however. Where it 
does exist, more intensive support for meaningful participation will almost 
certainly still be necessary. Cincinnati, for example, experienced a severely 
destabilizing event with tragic, widespread consequences, and marginalized 
stakeholders in that situation were represented by proxies. Even so, the 
baseline conditions were also promoted through various other means, includ-
ing hybridity, the facilitation of direct stakeholder participation, and penalty 
defaults. Given the ambitious goals of New Governance to challenge the 
status quo on the basis of the perspectives of marginalized stakeholders, it 
seems unlikely that purely passive systems could overcome the challenges to 
meaningful participation faced by marginalized stakeholders.143 
At the active end of the spectrum are court-based systems, where ex-
traordinary powers are wielded over participants in order to promote the 
baseline conditions. While such powers may be necessary where the base-
line conditions are wholly absent, as in the case of destabilization lawsuits, 
active New Governance systems are not limited to court settings. Legisla-
tures, administrative agencies, and other institutions with regulatory powers 
can also actively promote the baseline conditions. Private organizations can 
serve this function as well. Employers, for example, wield strong influence 
over their employees and have significant ability to promote the baseline 
141 Ford, supra note 3, at 484-85 ("[TJhe development of active contestation and deliber-
ation within New Governance structures cannot be presumed. It must be fostered, ensured, 
and protected."). 
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conditions within their own institutions. Grant-making institutions can also 
play instrumental roles in promoting meaningful participation by providing 
soft incentives for others to carry out goals that include the interests of 
marginalized stakeholders. 
Each of these types of entities has some ability to promote the baseline 
conditions in New Governance systems. They can impose framework goals 
that incorporate the interests of marginalized stakeholders, motivate others 
to pursue those goals, support the ability of proxies to adequately represent 
marginalized stakeholders, and support mobilization efforts. Active archi-
tects may work on multiple levels, either in concert or in tandem. In the 
University of Michigan case study, for example, three levels of architects-
Congress, a federal agency, and a university-actively promoted the mean-
ingful participation by marginalized stakeholders. 
The case of Wisconsin's innocence reform initiative presents another 
example of multiple architects actively working to promote meaningful par-
ticipation in tandem, if not in concert. The Wisconsin Supreme Court im-
posed new standards for eyewitness-identification procedures, and the 
legislature responded by requiring local law-enforcement agencies to use 
New Governance-type methods to revise their procedures to meet legal stan-
dards. 144 In addition, the Wisconsin Innocence Project and a state legislator 
were instrumental in encouraging, designing, and implementing the New 
Governance process on the local level. l45 All of these architects actively 
promoted the meaningful participation of marginalized stakeholders. 
The question of who wields the power to actively promote meaningful 
participation, and whether they are willing to use that power to promote 
meaningful participation, is a critical but often overlooked aspect of the dis-
cussion. 146 In her analysis of the participation of inner-city residents in the 
urban-development process, Audrey McFarlane suggests that participation 
must be "properly understood as not only a form of participatory inclusion, 
but also as a struggle for redistribution of power." 147 To promote meaningful 
participation by marginalized stakeholders is therefore to promote a shift in 
power. Given the barriers that exist to altering dominant norms based on the 
input of traditionally unempowered stakeholders, it is not surprising that ac-
tive promotion of meaningful participation is necessary, or that without ac-
tive promotion, cosmetic participation is likely to result. 
The use of power to promote meaningful participation is, notably, a key 
point at which the analogy between New Governance systems and business 
transactions breaks down. While the same baseline conditions are necessary 
to promote meaningful participation in both, the consequences of a failed 
New Governance system are more significant than the consequences of a 
144 See Kruse, supra note 33, at 647--48. 
145 See id. at 707-19. 
146 Cohen, supra note 62, at 533 ("[T]he governance paradigm tends to bracket power 
asymmetries and to view the public sphere as a rather depoliticized arena of collaboration 
among generic 'stakeholders.' "). 
147 See McFarlane, supra note 45, at 929. 
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failed business transaction. The New Governance approach is meant to de-
cide legal and policy decisions, and to avoid the harms of cosmetic 
processes, architects must be both able and willing to actively promote 
meaningful participation by marginalized stakeholders. 
E. A Baseline Theory of Prevention 
Ultimately, the baseline-conditions framework may be used to thwart 
the occurrence of cosmetic processes, as well as to aid in designing systems 
that are more likely to improve outcomes and accountability. 
The baseline-conditions framework for promoting meaningful partici-
pation gives rise to a threshold test for analyzing, in any given instance, 
whether the New Governance approach is an appropriate method of problem 
solving, or whether it is too susceptible to producing a cosmetic process. 
The test is that if the baseline conditions exist or can be established, then the 
New Governance approach may be suitable for the circumstances. If the 
baseline conditions do not exist and are unlikely to be established, then the 
risk of producing a merely cosmetic process is unacceptably high, and the 
New Governance model should be rejected in favor of other problem-solv-
ing methods. 
This test constitutes a baseline theory of prevention against cosmetic 
processes. The circumstances under which Cincinnati's police-reform initia-
tive was undertaken provide a helpful illustration. In this instance, the ap-
propriate point at which to apply the baseline theory of prevention would 
have been when the court and the litigants first considered whether to en-
gage in a New Governance-style settlement process. 
Before deciding that a New Governance process was appropriate for the 
circumstances, the court and the litigants might have first considered 
whether the two baseline conditions existed. In other words, they might 
have asked: Is there a common goal toward which all of the stakeholders are 
motivated, and are the contributions of the city's African American residents 
likely to be recognized by other stakeholders as valuable? 
As suggested by the preceding analysis, the answer to both questions 
would likely have been yes. Many different factors were in place that would 
support the two baseline conditions: destabilizing events, hybridity, penalty 
defaults, architect-imposed goals, legitimized proxies, and the fact that the 
proxies were endowed with veto power over the outcome. These conditions, 
taken together, would have strongly indicated that the New Governance 
model had the potential to produce meaningful participation. 
To use another example, consider the case study of community health 
centers that provide patients with a majority of seats on their governing 
boards. Federal legislation defines the goal of improving health care through 
patient participation. It also provides the motivation of grant funding, which 
is especially promising since participants are self-selecting; those who apply 
are likely to be strongly inclined to share the goal. Further, even if some 
employees might be reluctant to embrace the goal of patient participation, 
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the center's power over its employees would still enable it to promote the 
goal. The legislation's definition of the goal, the soft motivation of the grant 
funding, and the employer's coercive power thus all strongly support the first 
baseline condition, or the creation of motivation toward a common goal. 
The second baseline condition, or recognition of the marginalized 
stakeholder's contribution to the goal, was also supported. The value of the 
patients' input is apparent. The legislation specifically affords them a major-
ity of seats on the board, building direct stakeholder participation into the 
system and affording the marginalized stakeholders a very precise amount of 
weight-board control. Again, because the center wields significant power 
over employees, other opportunities to promote the recognition of patient 
input also exist. All of these factors indicate strong promise for meaningful 
participation under these circumstances. 
The threshold test, in short, assesses whether the two baseline condi-
tions are present and whether they can be induced. This entails an evalua-
tion of whether an architect (or architects) is able and willing to exert the 
power necessary to support these conditions. Each of these questions is crit-
ical to assessing whether the New Governance model is likely to produce a 
participatory process with integrity or whether it is too susceptible to 
subversion. 
Admittedly, at best, any prospective application of the threshold test 
provides simply a rough assessment, and as discussed earlier, the baseline 
conditions do not guarantee that meaningful participation will occur, that the 
participants will ultimately agree on a resolution, or that participants' needs 
will be adequately addressed. In addition, the threshold test does not address 
the difficult questions of identifying all stakeholders, ensuring that participa-
tion will be robust, or ensuring that stakeholders will remain sufficiently 
motivated over the extended period of time necessary to implement a New 
Governance process. 14X Consequently, the baseline theory of prevention 
serves only as a threshold consideration of whether conditions might possi-
bly support meaningful participation, and thus whether a New Governance 
process should even be considered. 
Despite its limitations, even a threshold assessment tool is urgently 
needed. Learning to distinguish situations where there is some possibility 
that meaningful participation will occur, from those where it is not, is criti-
cally important to reducing cosmetic processes. A third example demon-
strates this principle. In a case study presented by Douglas Nejaime, a 
school district invited both Christian fundamentalists and gay-rights groups 
148 As mentioned in the analogy of business transactions, in the car repair context, the 
need for ongoing motivation in the face of changing circumstances is a concern. As noted, this 
article focuses primarily on a threshold assessment of whether a New Governance system has 
the potential to provide meaningful participation (an assessment made at a particular point in 
time, before the New Governance system is embarked upon), and not on the challenges of 
sustaining or implementing the process itself. For a discussion of some ways to sustain moti-
vations over time, see Sturm, supra note 67, at 327 (discussing "organizational catalysts," 
capacity building, and other means of supporting sustained implementation). 
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to assist in developing a sexual-education curriculum. 149 School administra-
tors might have first considered whether the stakeholders shared a common 
goal, or whether one could be induced. The two groups held such deeply 
divergent ideological views about the substance of that curriculum 150 that 
they effectively shared no common goal; rather, each wished the final out-
come to exclude the other side's perspective. 
According to the baseline theory of prevention, a process lacking a 
common goal and recognition by one side of the other's contribution is too 
likely to end without agreement, and to produce merely cosmetic participa-
tion. Had school administrators applied the baseline-conditions test and re-
alized that the circumstances at hand were not conducive to meaningful 
participation, it could have ruled out the use of New Governance as inappro-
priate for those circumstances and prevented a significant loss of time and 
effort. 
Alternatively, school administrators could also have considered 
whether the baseline conditions could be better promoted. For instance, 
since a common goal was not apparent, school administrators might have 
asked whether they could define a common goal for the participants that 
included both perspectives, such as a curriculum presenting both viewpoints. 
Motivations toward that goal would also need to be established, so adminis-
trators might have considered imposing a penalty default that would take 
effect if the sides did not agree, such as the imposition of a curriculum that 
neither side would be satisfied with. 
The administrators would also have needed to promote the recognition 
by each group of what the other group contributed to the goal. Toward that 
end, they might have specified that in order to avoid the penalty default, both 
sides must agree on the curriculum, so that each side would have veto 
power. Administrators might also have considered additional steps, such as 
supporting the process with alternative-dispute-resolution processes and en-
suring face-to-face meetings. 
If both sides were willing to negotiate under these conditions, perhaps 
meaningful participation might have been possible. Were administrators un-
willing or unable to take these or other steps to promote the baseline condi-
tions, however, they would need to accept that the lack of the baseline 
conditions made these circumstances a poor candidate for a New Govern-
ance process. 
The baseline-conditions framework can thus be applied not only to 
identify situations in which the New Governance process might not be ap-
propriate but to design systems that have a significantly greater likelihood of 
producing meaningful participation. A significant component of this test is 
that the architect must consider how he or she might try to promote the 
baseline conditions, thus forcing the architect to consider whether the archi-
149 Nejaime, supra note 28, at 336. 
1511 [d. at 358 C[TJhe intensely adversarial legal and political relationship between these 
two movements poses a perhaps insurmountable challenge to the consensus norm."). 
2013] Participatory Governance 439 
tect itself is both able and willing to exert the necessary power over the 
participants. If the architect were not, the architect would recognize the 
need to reject the New Governance model as too susceptible to producing a 
cosmetic result. 
Assessing the risk of a cosmetic process at the outset could drastically 
reduce the number of cosmetic processes undertaken, yet it is a frequently 
neglected step. This may be in part due to the fact that a comprehensive 
assessment mechanism has not yet been formulated. A variety of theories 
for distinguishing when New Governance is appropriate and when it is not 
have been proposed. For example, one thesis suggests that New Governance 
should be pursued where participants face "urgent" problems and seek 
"joint accountability."151 Another theory suggests applying the New Gov-
ernance model when participants share readily observable common ground 
and trust, and do not have strong ideological differences. 
Additional theories exist,152 and each formulation valuably describes a 
subset of situations in which the New Governance model might be fruitfully 
applied. None individually, however, provides a comprehensive vision; nor 
do these existing theories collectively provide a cohesive vision. The base-
line-conditions framework is consistent with each of these other theories, 
cohesively capturing the concepts embedded into them within a single 
framework, while also building in specific protections against the abuse of 
cosmetic processes. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Given the barriers to the meaningful participation of poor people in 
New Governance processes, it is tempting to conclude that meaningful par-
ticipation is likely to occur only under extremely rare circumstances, and 
that consequently, most problems of poverty law are unsuitable for the New 
Governance approach. Further, even the most promising proposals dis-
cussed in this article do not guarantee that participation will be meaningful 
or that the concerns of marginalized stakeholders will be adequately 
addressed. 
Even so, the threshold test serves some critical purposes. When appli-
cation of the test results in the rejection of the New Governance approach as 
inappropriate for a particular set of circumstances, a cosmetic process is 
151 Dorf & Sabel, supra note 1. at 322. 
152 Another thesis holds that a New Governance-style approach is suitable when all par-
ticipants see personal benefit in changing the status quo. but are uncertain how to make change 
and need others' input. See Simon, supra note 69, at 209; see also James S. Liebman & 
Charles F. Sabel, The Fragile Promise (~t Provisionality, 28 N.Y.U. REv. L & Soc. CHANGE 
369, 370 (2003) ("People disserved by the current system are sufficiently aggrieved by the 
resulting costs that it is worth their while to coalesce to disentrench established interests, pro-
vided that there is a minimally acceptable prospect of success and accountability."). A fourth 
proposal holds that New Governance methods should only be pursued when participants are 
aware that they do not have strong default positions. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 57, at 
1100. 
440 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 7 
likely to have been thwarted. Moreover, when the test indicates circum-
stances supportive of meaningful participation, an opportunity for effectuat-
ing substantive change might be seized. While no single success will 
resolve the problems of deeply entrenched marginalization, even rare oppor-
tunities for incremental change should not be lightly dismissed. Every in-
stance of a successful New Governance process serves to embed 
marginalized voices more deeply and systemically into decision-making 
processes. Furthermore, the 1earning-by-doing component of the New Gov-
ernance model supports scaling up and adapting successful experiments for 
use in other contexts, potentially broadening the impact of even small-scale, 
localized change. 
While much work remains to be done to bring this vision to reality, 
articulating the vision is an important step. Reversing long-standing inequi-
ties will require as many tools as can be imagined, and New Governance is 
one. 
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App. 1 
Two Baseline Conditions Must Exist Before Meaningful Participation Is Possible. 
Condition 1: Motivations Toward Condition 2: Recognition of 
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Common Goal Toward the Goal of Contributions 
Business Participants define Participants define Contributions easily 
transactions common goal. motivations. recognized. 
Passive New · "Destabilizing · "Destabilizing · Rely on proxies, if Governance eyent" creates eyent" creates appropriate. 
systems outside common goa1. motivation. 
of the courts · Rely on mobilization. if · Participants define appropriate. motivation, strongly 
· Participants supported by define common lacilitators. · Architect lacilitates goal, strongly appropriate reliance on 
supported by proxies/mobilization. 
lacilitators. · Hybridity creates motiYatioll. 
· Architect defines "framework" goal that~ 
· Architect motivates by its nature. anords (c.g.~ weight to participants' 
grant input. 
penalty 
· Architect · Architect delines a imposes specilic weight to be 
common alTorded to participants' 
"framework" input. 
goal. 
Court-based Legal system Legal system imposes Legal systems affords 
New imposes common motivation. significant weight to 
Governance goal. plaintiffs' input. 
Active system 
